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I     INTRODUCTION 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) commenced on January 1, 
1995, after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1947 was the principal multilateral agreement regulating trade 
among nations by reducing tariffs.1 The signing of the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Negotiations formally established the WTO.2 The Final Act was the 
culmination of the negotiations launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay 
in September 1986. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Sharjah, UAE. He holds an SJD in 
International Trade law from the American University, Washington College of 
Law, and an LLM in International Trade law from the University of Arizona. 
Thanks and gratitude is due for the anonymous referees for their thoughtful 
commentary and critique regarding earlier drafts of this article. 
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 
1947, 55 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 January 1948). See also Jalil Kasto, 
The Function and Future of the World Trade Organization: International 
Trade Law between GATT and WTO (Kingston, 1996) 4. 
2 ‘Over 100 Nations Sign GATT Accord to Cut Barriers to World Trade’ (1994) 
11 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 61. 
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     Unlike the GATT 1947, the WTO is recognised as an 
organisation.3 In addition, while the GATT 1947 covered trade in 
goods only, the WTO covers trade in services and intellectual 
property.4 The WTO secures the smooth flow of trade among 
nations, settles trade disputes among governments and organises 
trade negotiations.5 The WTO acts as both a forum for negotiating 
international trade agreements and the monitoring and regulating 
body for enforcing the agreements. Decision-making in the WTO is 
primarily by consensus.6 
 
 
WTO binding disputesettlementprocedures, through Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), replaced the weaker dispute 
settlement process that had existed under GATT.7 One principal 
criticism of GATT was that its dispute settlement mechanism was 
ineffective. For example, under GATT, dispute panels handed down 
                                                 
3 The WTO consists of primary and subsidiary organs. The four primary organs 
are the Ministerial Conference, the General Council, the Secretariat, and the 
Director General. The subsidiary organs of the WTO are the Council for Trade 
in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for TRIPS, the 
Committee on Trade and Development, and the Committee on Budget, 
Finance, and Administration. 
4 See Asif H. Quaeshi, The World Trade Organization - Implementing 
International Trade Norms (Manchester University Press, 1996) 5. 
5 The WTO agreement contained in approximately 23,000 pages of agreements 
that incorporate, by reference, the GATT 1947, amendments to the GATT 
made in 1994 (GATT 1994), 17 multilateral agreements, four plurilateral 
agreements, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations. The WTO agreements 
regulate tariffs on trade in manufactured goods and agriculture, services, 
intellectual property, food, customs, dispute settlement system, and 
government procurement. Special provisions for developing nations include 
longer time periods for implementing agreements and commitments, special 
measures to increase trading opportunities for these countries, provisions 
requiring all WTO members to safeguard the trade interests of developing 
countries, and technical assistance and support to help developing countries 
build their infrastructure: Quaeshi, above n 4, 5. 
6 See Anna Lanoszka, ‘The Promises of Multilateralism and the Hazards of 
'Single Undertaking': The Breakdown of Decision Making Within the WTO’ 
(2008) 16(3) Michigan State Journal of International Law 655, 662-663.  
7 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened 
for signature 15 April 1994, 33 International Legal Materials 1125 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995), Annex 2 (‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes’). 
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findings that had to be accepted by both sides and the other 
Contracting Parties before they were adopted. Refusal by one 
Contracting Party such as the losing party meant that a panel report 
was simply set aside.8 Thus, in effect, under the GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism, the losing party in a dispute could block the 
adoption of a panel ruling. The WTO created a more potent dispute 
settlement process than had existed previously. The DSU established 
firm deadlines to file initial submissions, appeals, and enforce 
rulings.9 Also, the DSU rules govern notice, consultations, 
discovery, panel establishment and proceedings, and report 
circulation. Furthermore, the DSU set up a permanent Appellate 
Body to review appeals of panel decisions. Throughout its existence, 
the DSU has proved its efficiency in settling disputes between WTO 
members covering a whole range of WTO agreements. As such, the 
dispute settlement of the WTO and its Appellate Body has been 
described as the crown jewel of the WTO legal system.10 
 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system has been in effect for nearly 
17 years. Over the span of that period, a total of 130 cases have been 
decided by the WTO.11 Of those 130 cases, no Arab country has ever 
initiated a case before a panel as a complainant,12 and Egypt has 
been the only Arab country that was a respondent in a case.13Arab 
countries find themselves at a disadvantage when it comes to 
effectively litigating trade disputes before dispute settlement panels 
                                                 
8 See Michael Patrick Tkacik, ‘Post-Uruguay Round GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement: Substance, Strengths, Weaknesses, and Causes for Concerns’ 
(1997) 9 International Legal Perspectives 169, 175.  
9 See Aaron Catbagan, ‘Rights of Action for Private Non-state Actors in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2009) 37(2) Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 279, 280.  
10 See Robert Howse, ‘Process and Procedure in WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Moving the WTO Forward - One Case at a Time’ (2009) 42(2) Cornell 
International Law Journal 223, 224.  
11 See Len Bracken, ‘WTO Dispute System at Record Level of Activity, Wilson 
Says, Predicts AB Surge’ International Trade Reporter (BNA) 27, 6 May 2010, 
660.   
12 See Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes – Addendum, WTO Doc 
WT/DSB/49/Add.1, (11 May 2009) (Dispute Settlement Body Annual Report). 
13 See Panel Report, Egypt-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar 
from Turkey, WTO Doc WT/DS211/R (8 August 2002).  
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and securing remedies against other WTO member states.Without 
Arab countries participation in the WTO dispute settlement system, 
it can be suggested that they may not know the law and therefore 
cannot avoidfuture disputes. Arab countries ought to participate in 
the dispute settlement system and act more assertively, as these are 
perhaps the best methods to gain expertise in winning disputes. 
 
 
     Under-representation by Arab countries in the WTO dispute 
settlement process is a danger to the long-term legitimacy and 
credibility of the WTO. The WTO is more than a table for trade 
negotiations among its members. The WTO also aims to achieve free 
trade and economic development.14 If the WTO intends to achieve 
its stated principles, then it should be aware of inequities in the 
dispute settlement process and treatment of Arab countries. 
Developed countries should also work toward resolving the 
problems that prevent Arab countries from making use of the dispute 
settlement mechanism.15 Utilisation of the WTO dispute settlement 
process would give Arab countries "renewed" faith in the WTO 
system.16 In sum, the proper functioning of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is in the interest of all WTO members.  
 
 
                                                 
14 See Tomer Broude, ‘The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: 
Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO’ (2007) 
45(1) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221, 232-234. 
15 See Thaddeus McBride, ‘Rejuvenating the WTO: Why the US Must Assist 
Developing Countries in Trade Disputes’ (1999) 11 International Legal 
Perspectives 65, 95. See also Andrea Greisberger, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy 
of the World Trade Organization: Why the United States and the European 
Union Should Support the Advisory Centre on WTO Law’ (2004) 37(3) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 827, 855.  
16 See Raj Bhala, ‘Discovering Great Opportunity in the Midst of Great Crisis: 
Building International Legal Frameworks for a Higher Standard of Living: 
Doha Round Betrayals’ (2010) 24(1) Emory International Law Review 147, 
181 (the initial goal for the WTO Doha Round was to boost trade with Arab 
countries, one that regrettably has been lost. The December 2008 draft 
modalities text is silent about the Arab world. There is the perception among 
Arab countries that the Round does little to address their serious problems. As 
such, Arab countries are in special need of integration into the GATT-WTO 
order).   
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     The purpose of the present article is two-fold. First, the article 
examines the reasons as to why Arab countries do not actively 
participate in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.17 Trade volume, 
lack of technical expertise, financial strains, political relations, 
enforcement, and language problems eachplay a role in Arab 
countries under-participation and are discussed herein. Second, the 
article provides possible avenues through which Arab countries can 
enhance their presence in the WTO dispute settlement process. In the 
process of examining these issues, the article highlights the case(s) in 
which Arab countries participated in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. However, before addressing these issues, the article will 
briefly discuss the development of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
II     DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 
 
When the attempt to create an international trade organisation in the 
late 1940s failed, the successfully-negotiated trade agreement, the 
GATT, was left without a well-defined institutional structure. The 
death of the International Trade Organization was attributed to the 
domestic political situation in the US.18 
                                                 
17 The list of Arab countries includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. See Arab League, Member States 
<http://www.arableagueonline.org/wps/portal/las_en/inner> at 6 January 2012. 
18 The Truman administration confronted a new protectionist and isolationist 
Republican Congress.The US refused to join the International Trade 
Organization because of perceived threats to national sovereignty and the 
danger of too much intervention in markets. Congress feared that the 
International Trade Organization would be too much supranational. It was 
feared that there would be double delegation of power from Congress to the 
US President and from the President to an international organisation,thereby 
usurping the functions of Congress. In addition, the US Congressional support 
for the organisation was conditioned on dismantling of the British Imperial 
Preference system (Commonwealth system) devised at the Ottawa Conference 
in 1932; a system which was enacted partly in response to the US Smoot-
Hawley Act, because, as the US contended, it contravened the most-favored-
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Only a few articles with regard to dispute settlement were contained 
in the original GATT, most of which are centered on article XXIII. 
That article states that a member country may request consultations 
with another member country should it consider that the other 
member country's trade measure may lead to the nullification or 
impairment of its own expected benefit. Despite the rather skeletal 
framework of article XXIII, dispute settlement in the early stages of 
the GATT worked rather well, partially due to its small and 
homogenous membership.19 Since its inception in 1947, the GATT 
evolved into a comprehensive framework of international trade laws 
as it exists today under the WTO. In 1995, the WTO was established 
following the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the 
new dispute settlement procedures under the WTO altered several 
features of the previous GATT mechanism. 
 
 
The creation of the DSU is a substantial step in the gradual shift 
from a diplomatic and power-based approach in the settlement of 
international disputes to a more legalistic, law-based approach.20 
                                                                                                                
nation rule. Because of the British Commonwealth system, US economic 
interests were excluded from the British market and its satellite countries or 
dominions, such as South Africa, Canada, and India. The British refused to 
yield their position unless they received assurances from Congress to lower 
American tariffs. However, the US administration did not lower its tariffs and 
stood for its pledge to Congress by dismantling the British Commonwealth 
system. The linkage between the most-favored-nation rule and the 
Commonwealth system was a factor for loss of support for the International 
Trade Organization. See George Bronz, ‘An International Trade Organization: 
The Second Attempt’ (1956) 69(3) Harvard Law Review 440, 447-449, 473-476. 
19 See Rachel Brewster, ‘Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade 
Law at the WTO’ (2009) 30(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 1133, 1136. 
20 Countries advocating the pragmatic approach, highlighted the ambiguity of 
GATT rules, the political sensitivity of trade disputes, and the complex trade-
offs of competing interests that go into the formulation of any trade rule. Thus, 
those countries argued that GATT dispute resolution should not be formal, 
legal, or adjudicatory. See David K. Tarullo, ‘Logic, Myth and International 
Economic Order’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 533. On the 
other hand, The US argued that the GATT rules will become more clear and 
predictable if the GATT dispute resolution is characterised by rule-based 
decisions rendered through an adjudicatory dispute resolution process. The 
adjudication approach will increase compliance with the GATT standards and 
will alleviate protectionist pressures. See John H. Jackson, William J. Davey 
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Dispute settlement procedures are central in the WTO's mechanisms 
designed to ensure the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade as well as the elimination of discriminatory treatment in trade 
relations. 
 
 
The WTO dispute settlement is administered by a Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) which consists of the WTO's General 
Council. Among its powers, the DSB has the authority to establish 
panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain 
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and 
authorise suspension of concessions and other obligations under the 
WTO agreements.21 The dispute settlement system aims to resolve 
disputes by clarifying the rules of the multilateral trading system.22 
The WTO cannot legislate or directly promulgate new rules or 
regulations without explicit WTO member consent. 
 
 
When a WTO member believes that another member has taken 
an action that impairs benefits accruing to it, both directly or 
indirectly, under the Uruguay Round Agreements, it may request 
consultations to resolve the conflict through informal negotiations.23 
The consultations procedures is a mandatory first step to the WTO 
dispute settlement process and is codified and further developed by 
the DSU. The DSU requires written requests for consultations 
clearly stating reasons for the request, the legal basis for the 
complaint and an explanation of the measures in question.24 
Consultations aim at assisting disputing members to reach a 
mutually agreed solution; however, consultations must be conducted 
                                                                                                                
and Allan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: 
Cases, Materials, and Text on the National and International Regulation of 
Transnational Economic Relations 339 (West Publication Co., 1995). See also 
Michael K. Young, ‘Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers 
Triumph over Diplomats’ (1995) 29(5) International Lawyer 389, 392-405.  
21 See Webb McArthur, ‘Reforming Fairness: The Need for Legal Pragmatism in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Process’ (2010) 9(2) Richmond Journal of 
Global Law and Business 229, 232.   
22 See Marrakesh, above n 7, article 11. 
23 Ibid article 4.3. 
24 Ibid article 4.4. 
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in good faith before resorting to further action available to members 
under the DSU. 
 
 
     The DSU requires a member to respond to a request for 
consultations within 10 days, and the member is further required to 
engage in consultations within 30 days.25 In the event that 
consultations after 60 days from the receipt of the request fail to 
yield outcomes that are mutually agreeable, members may request 
the establishment of a panel to resolve the dispute.26 The 
consultation process is conducted without prejudice to the rights of 
any member in relation to the panel process and DSU. 
 
 
Panels generally consist of three individuals with expertise in 
international trade law and policy.27 These panelists hear and 
consider theevidence and then provide the DSB with areport which 
recommends a course of actionwithin six months.28 The DSB either 
adopts the report or decides by consensus not to accept it.29 
Alternatively, if one of the parties involved decides to appeal the 
decision, the report will not be considered for adoption until the 
completion of the appeal by the standing Appellate Body.30 An 
Appellate Body report is adopted unconditionally unless the DSB 
votes by consensus not to accept its findings within 30 days of 
circulation to the membership. 
 
 
     The WTO Secretariat manages a list from which panel members 
are selected. The DSU contains detailed rules on the composition of 
panels and clarifies necessary steps and the role of the WTO 
Director General should parties fail to agree on the panel's 
composition.31 Under the GATT dispute settlement system, only 
government officials served on panels; however, today the WTO 
                                                 
25 See Marrakesh, above n 7, article 4.4. 
26 Ibid article 4.7. 
27 Ibid article 8.1. 
28 Ibid article 12.7-8. 
29 Ibid article 16.4. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid article 8.4, 7.  
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allows well-qualified non-government individuals to serve on a 
panel. The DSU forbids a potential panel member from serving on a 
panel if he or she is a citizen of a party to the dispute, or a citizen of 
a third party, unless the parties agree otherwise.32 
 
 
The WTO panel process consists of two sets of submissions, two 
sets of rebuttals, two oral hearings, with accompanying questions 
and answers throughout, before the panel makes its interim report to 
the parties.33 Thus, all evidence in the case is submitted and 
evaluated before any interim findings of fact, applicable law, or 
WTO violations are made by the panel. 
 
 
As stipulated in DSU, a WTO panel is required to make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of, and 
conformity with the WTO covered agreements.34 Therefore, like any 
tribunal of first instance, WTO panels make findings of fact, 
applicable law, and, applying such law to the facts, violations of law. 
Appeals are limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and 
legal interpretations adopted by the panel.35 The panel's findings on 
factual issues thus escape from appellate review. The appellate 
review process is limited to upholding, modifying or reversing the 
panel's legal findings and conclusions. The possibility of remanding 
a case to the panel is not provided for. 
 
 
 
III     ARAB COUNTRIES AS COMPAINANTS OR 
RESPONDENTS 
 
In the GATT, Arab countries wereseldom involved in disputes. In 
fact, in only one dispute was an Arab country involved as a main 
part, in other words as a complainant or respondent. The one country 
                                                 
32 See Marrakesh, above n 7, article 8.1. 
33 Ibid article 15.1.  
34 Ibid article 11. 
35 Ibid article 17.6. 
                    FLINDERS LAW JOURNAL                           [(2012 
10 
 
was Egypt. The case concerned definitive anti-dumping measures 
imposed by Egypt on imports of concrete steel reinforcing bar 
(rebar) from Turkey.36 Egypt divided foreign exporters for the 
purposes of an anti-dumping investigation into cooperative and non-
cooperative companies. The whole case revolved around the 
relationship between what an investigating authority is obligated by 
the anti-dumping agreement to do in regards to procedural issues in 
an anti-dumping investigation, and what interested parties must 
themselves contribute in the way of evidence and argument. The 
panel found Egypt acted consistently with its obligations under the 
agreement in some parts. However, the panel decided that Egypt 
acted in violation of the agreement because the investigating 
authority had ‘examined’ all the relevant economic factors in article 
3.4 of the anti-dumping agreement without ‘evaluation’ of these 
factors.37 The panel also found that in respect of two Turkish 
companies (Icdas and IDC) out of five companies in the 
investigation, the Egyptian authority did not provide the two with 
ample opportunity to defend themselves and inform them that their 
submissions were being rejected, though they submitted, under 
article 6.8, all the necessary requested information.38 
 
 
     Egypt was also a respondent in three other cases.39 Consultations 
between Egypt and the other parties in those cases within the WTO 
framework were successful in ending the disputes in question. Thus, 
Egypt's case with Turkey regarding the former imposition of a 
definitive anti-dumping measure on imports of steel rebar from the 
latter stands as the only case involving Arab country that went through 
all stages of WTO dispute settlement proceedings ending in a panel 
report. 
                                                 
36 See Panel Report, Egypt-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar 
from Turkey, above n 13. 
37 Ibid [7.42-45]. 
38 Ibid [7.252-266]. 
39 See Egypt-Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil from 
Thailand, WTO Doc WT/DS205 (22 September 2000) (Request for 
Consultations by Thailand); Egypt-Measures Affecting Imports of Textile and 
Apparel Products, WTO Doc WT/DS305, (23 December 2003) (Request for 
Consultations by the United States); Egypt-Anti-dumping Duties on Matches 
from Pakistan, WTO Doc WT/DS327, (21 February 2005) (Request for 
Consultations by Pakistan).  
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Egypt has been active in this process, having been challenged on 
four occasions. No Arab country, however - including Egypt - has ever 
been a complainant. Obviously, Egypt, among all other Arab countries, 
is the most experienced in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that Egypt has been a GATT/WTO 
member for a long time, unlike many other Arab countries whose 
membership is relatively recent (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Jordan). 
Despite this, Egypt's expertise in the WTO dispute settlement process is 
still lacking. For example, in the Egypt-Turkey anti-dumping case in 
which Egypt presented an excellent argument, Egypt's counsel was 
the law firm of Van Beal and Bellis of Brussels, Belgium, and not a 
local firm.40 Dependence on foreign law firms could diminish as 
Arab countries develop in-house expertise. 
 
 
 
IV     CHALLENGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
 
Lack of effective participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
process by Arab countries may indicate that they are not rule 
breakers. However, this is only part of the truth. Arab countries face 
several challenges that weigh on their choice whether or not to bring 
an action before the WTO. Among the challenges are total trade 
volume, lack of technical expertise and financial resources, political 
pressure and power relations, and cultural attitudes toward judicial 
settlement of disputes.Arab countries seem to have most of the same 
problems as other developing country members, but they suffer from 
more serious issues such as trade marginalisation, and their efforts to 
develop well-trained trade lawyers have lagged behind developing 
countries in Latin America and parts of Asia.41 These challenges will 
be addressed herein, respectively.  
 
                                                 
40 See The European Commission, Internet Chat with E.U Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy and Egyptian Trade Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, New WTO Round: 
Talking Trade-What’s Going on? (13 November 2002) 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/chat/lamy9/index_en.htm>.  
41 See Bhala, above n 16, 180. 
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A     Trade Volume 
 
Arab countries' minimal involvement in the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings may be attributed to the modest level of their 
contribution to world investment and trade. Foreign investment in 
Arab countries is miniscule.42 Over the years, Arab countries have 
experienced a 75 percent drop in its share of world export since 
1980.43 In addition, Arab countries are not significant exporters as 
they account for only about one percent of world exports of 
manufactured goods.44 Arab countries account for approximately 20 
percent of world fuel and mining exports.45 Thus, Arab countries 
account for less than five percent of total world exports. Although 
oil is considered a major export for Arab countries, it is a product 
barely addressed by the WTO.46 This state of affair makes Arab 
countries less accessible to dispute cases as either complainants or 
respondents. 
 
 
However, low level of trade is by no means a completely valid 
barrier to WTO litigation. Argentina, for example, which accounts 
for only 0.6 percent of world trade, is one of the most challenged 
                                                 
42 See Gary G. Yerkey, ‘US Trade Policy Overlooks Middle East Region, Could 
Hurt War on Terrorism, PPI Study Says’ (2003) 20 International Trade 
Reporter (BNA) 323. (The entire Arab world received only $13.6 billion in 
FDI, barely more than Sweden all by itself).  
43 Ibid. 
44 See World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics (2011) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011_e/its11_toc_e.htm>. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Since the GATT came into existence in 1947, there has been an informal 
understanding among contracting parties not to subject oil to multilateral tariff 
concessions negotiations.Some of the theoretical reasons for the apparent 
ambivalent attitude of contemporary international trade regime to oil trade 
include the definition of energy as good or service which in itself is not 
without controversy, location of energy at the heart of government economic 
thinking, and oil as a vital national asset not to be left to free international trade 
trajectories. See Francis N. Botchway, ‘International Trade Regime and Energy 
Trade’ (2001) 28(1) Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 1, 
11, 12. 
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nations before the WTO, after the US and the EU.47 In addition, 
although Brazil accounts for about one percent of world trade, it has 
participated in 89 WTO cases heard thus far.48 India is also an active 
participant in the WTO dispute settlement cases despite the fact that 
its share of world trade is under 0.8 percent.49 
 
 
     As Arab countries continue opening their markets, integrating 
fully into the world trading system, and increasing their economic 
output and growth, participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings will likely become an essential part of their trade 
policies. Such increase in economic growth and trade relationships 
would significantly increase the probability of frictions arising as a 
result of trade barriers, which exporting Arab countries may be 
willing to challenge in dispute settlement. 
 
 
B     Lack of Technical Expertise and Financial Resources 
 
Another reason that Arab countries are not frequent users of the 
WTO dispute settlement system is a lack of expertise and knowledge 
of complicated WTO law with some complaints crossing between 
several WTO agreements. Bringing a case before a WTO panel is an 
extensive exercise that requires presenting evidence, preparing 
commercial data - which in some instances may not be provided by 
the other party involved in the dispute meaning that it must be 
obtained from other sources - studies, econometric modeling, and 
substantial documentation.50 Moreover, under the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, the use of experts has become much more 
                                                 
47 See WorldTradeLaw.net, List of WTO Complaints Brought Pursuant to the 
DSU (14 January 2012) <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/stats.htm>. 
48 See Mesut Aydin, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing 
Countries: Lessons for Turkey (LLM Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, 2007) 28 <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/BF09AE98-D8D3-
8566-4520B0D124E5614D/Mesut_Aydin.pdf >. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See Gregory Shaffer, ‘The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing 
Country Adaptation’ (2006) 5(2) World Trade Review 177, 182. 
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common.51 In sum, launching a WTO case requires preparatory 
work in addition to the evolving need to present evidence, testimony, 
and economic data during litigation. With the lapse of time and the 
growing knowledge of the WTO law, one might expect Arab 
countries to use the WTO dispute settlement system more 
frequently. 
 
 
     Linked with the issue of technical expertise is that of the 
availability of competent staff. A major hindrance facing Arab 
countries full participation in the work of the WTO is insufficient 
human resources. Arab countries representation in the WTO is 
limited to a single or a handful of officials. Moreover, delegations of 
Arab countries in Geneva do not cover the work of the WTO 
exclusively, but they also participate in other Geneva-based 
organisations such as the United Nations and its specialised agencies 
including the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, World Intellectual Property Organization, 
International Telecommunication Union, and International 
Organization for Standardization. Egypt, with its ten professional 
staff members, has the largest delegation among Arab countries.52 
The number of professional staff in Geneva-based WTO delegations 
for other Arab countries is: Bahrain - two; Djibouti - one; Jordan - 
two; Kuwait - two; Morocco - three; Mauritania - two; Oman - three; 
Qatar - one; Saudi Arabia - three; Tunisia - two; and United Arab 
Emirates - three.53 Furthermore, an issue may arise in the future if 
poor Arab countries such as the Sudan and Somalia accede to the 
                                                 
51 See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2002) 
51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 325. 
52 Egypt is one of a handful of Arab countries within the WTO that has an 
ambassador in Geneva appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a trade 
mission, located in different premises in Geneva, whose staff are appointed by 
the Ministry of Trade and headed by a minister plenipotentiary. The two 
ministers and missions have divergent views on trade that lead to internal as 
well as external conflicts. See Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the 
Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations (Zed 
Books, 2003) 21, 171. 
53 Fakhry Hazimeh, Director of Economic Bureau, Permanent Mission of Jordan, 
Geneva, Switzerland provided information on Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and UAE (December 22, 2011) (on 
file with author).  
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WTO as they may not have the capabilities to have fully-fledged 
delegations in Geneva, one of the world's most expensive cities. 
 
 
     Being small in size is only one part of the equation. The other 
interlinked part is having skilled and versatile WTO delegations. 
Many of the trade representatives in Arab delegations attend 
numerous daily meetings - often taking place at the same time - 
without the ability to develop, much less maintain mastery 
knowledge.54 Getting to know how WTO panels hold hearings and 
make decisions is critical for taking advantage of the dispute 
settlement system. Arab countries must dedicate a small portion of 
their annual budgets, despite their constraints, to train their personnel 
if they want to take part in the WTO dispute settlement process 
effectively and avoid being onlookers. 
 
 
Moreover, litigating a WTO case, which may take several years, 
is very costly. A WTO case estimated to cost roughly US$500,000 if 
taken through to the Appellate Body.55 This figure could be 
increased substantially when a private law firm is hired to litigate the 
case before the WTO. According to estimates, private law firms can 
charge anywhere from $250 to $1,000 per hour in fees, leading to 
total fees anywhere between $100,000 to over $1,000,000.56 
Furthermore, these figures increase even further in intricate cases, 
                                                 
54 Staffing is very critical because of the need to participate in various meetings. 
The WTO has 67 bodies including 34 standing bodies open to all members, 28 
accession working parties, and five plurilateral bodies. In 2001, there were 
nearly 400 formal meetings of WTO bodies, 500 informal meetings, 90 
workshops and seminars sponsored by the WTO. Officials in the South Korean 
delegation complain about the workload of the WTO despite the fact that they 
have 30 staff. See Jawara and Kwa, above n 52, 22.  
55 See Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, ‘Developing Countries and 
Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough’ 
(2008) 42(1) Journal of World Trade 177, 189-192. 
56 See James C. Hartigan (ed), Frontiers of Economics and Globalization: 
Volume 6 - Trade Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the 
WTO: An Interdisciplinary Assessment (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 
2009) 167-190. 
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such as Japan-Photographic Film, where legal fees charged to Kodak 
and Fuji were reportedly in excess of US$10 million.57 
 
 
     Due to their already constrained budgets, financial investment in 
WTO legal proceedings by the majority of Arab countries makes no 
or less sense. Therefore, unless Arab countries pool their financial 
resources together and invest in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings it could prove very difficult for a single Arab country to 
initiate a case on its own. Access to the pool's fund and spreading the 
cost among Arab countries would therefore make WTO litigation 
more affordable. 
  
 
C     Political Relations and Pressures 
 
Arab countries take political considerations into account when 
deciding whether or not to file a complaint. A case in point was inthe 
US genetically modified organism (GMO) case against the EU. 
Egypt may have been in a Scylla and Charybdis position when it 
decided to settle its dispute with the EU out of court. If Egypt 
supported the US in the sensitive GMO case, it would have upset its 
relations with the EU. By the same token, if Egypt did not support 
the US, it would have led to a souring in trade relations between the 
US and Egypt.58 Ultimately, Egypt chose to settle the dispute with 
the EU without litigation. Perhaps, without EU pressure, Egypt may 
have pressed ahead with the dispute against the EU.  
 
 
                                                 
57 Hartigan, above n 56. 
58 See Gary G. Yerkey and Christopher S. Rugaber, ‘US and Egypt Beginning to 
See “Eye-to-Eye” on Need for FTA but No Talks Scheduled Yet’ (2003) 20 
International Trade Reporter (BNA), 1145 (quoting Boutros-Gali, Egypt’s 
[former] foreign trade minister, saying that Egypt wants to begin the [US FTA] 
negotiations “tomorrow”. However, the US has been cold toward negotiating 
FTA with Egypt. Some hint that this is because Egypt withdrew its support of 
the US in the Genetically Modified Organism case against the EU). See also 
Gary G. Yerkey, ‘Grassley Concerned over Egypt's Failure to Support US in 
WTO Case over GMOS’ (2003) 20 International Trade Reporter (BNA), 1110. 
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Political pressure applied by developed countries or a threat 
constitutes a deterrent for Arab countries so that they do not bring a 
case in the first place. For example, developed countries could 
threaten to withdraw preferential tariff benefits under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), foreign aid, or food aid 
were an Arab country to challenge a trade measure by the US or 
EU.59 Political pressure of threat therefore undermines Arab 
countries ability to effectively participate in the WTO dispute 
settlement process. 
 
 
D   Enforcement 
 
Like other developing countries, a potential inability of Arab 
countries to enforce an offending developed country's compliance 
may make the use of the WTO dispute settlement process less 
attractive.60 The WTO cannot force the offending country to remove 
the measure or pass an order to stop the measure from running.61 
Rather, the WTO primarily enforces its decisions by allowing the 
complaining country to undertake retaliatory actions against the 
offending country until the latter complies with the ruling. 
 
 
                                                 
59 See Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Power Plays and Capacity 
Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization 
Disputes’ (2005) 34(2) Journal of Legal Studies 557, 569.  
60 This does not mean that developed countries do not comply at all with WTO 
panel decisions. See Leah Granger, ‘Explaining the Broad-Based Support for 
WTO Adjudication’ (2006) 24(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law 521, 
523. See also David J. Townsend, ‘Stretching the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: US-Cotton's Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-Retaliation in the 
World Trade Organization’ (2010) 9(2) Richmond Journal of Global Law and 
Business 135, 153-159. 
61 See Suzanne Bermann, ‘EC-Hormones and the Case for an Express WTO 
Post-retaliation Procedure’ (2007) 107(1) Columbia Law Review 131, 138 (In 
comparison, US civil procedure authorises a judge to adjudicate liability, order 
an appropriate remedy, and enforce that order. Also, according to US civil 
procedures parties may be enjoined from taking certain actions; a party's non-
compliance under US federal law could lead to the initiation of contempt 
proceedings and result in a court-imposed penalty such as fines or 
imprisonment).  
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     However, adopting retaliatory trade measures against the 
offending country inflict more damage to the trade of the 
complaining country than the damage that was initially inflicted on it 
by the offending country.62 Moreover, a developing country 
retaliatory measure(s) against a developed country, such as the US or 
EU, is highly likely to have a relatively small impact on the 
economies of these developed countries.63 Thus, an ‘eye for an eye’ 
approach could be counterproductive especially if the wining party 
in the case is a developing country.  
 
 
A prominent case, the European Communities-Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, sheds light on the 
issue of non-compliance of developed countries with WTO 
decisions.64 In the Bananas case, the EU trade measure was found to 
violate WTO obligations.65 However, the EU easily absorbed the 
impact of Ecuador's retaliation while the EU took a further 30 
months to comply with the ruling after the expiry of the reasonable 
period of 15 months established by the dispute settlement body and 
easily withstood 27 months of retaliatory measures.66 
 
 
     To reduce the problem of enforcement, some developing 
countries have put forward proposals - as potential alternatives to 
retaliation - by introducing financial damages, collectively-imposed 
sanctions, or mandating that only countries that have fully complied 
                                                 
62 See Ruth Gordon, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave New World of the WTO 
Multilateral Trade Regime’ (2006) 8 Berkeley Journal of African-American 
Law and Policy 79, 104. See Clint Bodien, ‘Cross-Retaliation in the WTO: 
Antigua and Barbuda's Proposed Remedy against the United States in an 
Online Gambling Dispute’ (2008) 14(4) Law & Business Review of the 
Americas 847, 869.  
63 See Gordon, above n 62, 104. 
64 The heart of the disputewas the competing tensions faced by the EU between 
its obligations under the WTO and those under the Lome Convention to 
maintain preferential market access for certain developing countries. See 
Douglas Ierley, ‘Another Look at the Dispute Over Bananas’ (2002) 33 Law & 
Policy in International Business 615.  
65 Ibid 629-636. 
66 Ibid 641. 
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with previous decisions should be permitted to bring cases in the 
WTO.67 However, at the moment, these alternatives seem to be an 
unrealistic solution in light of opposition from developed countries 
and the fact that the Doha Round is stalled.68 Until a more plausible 
solution is devised, developing countries, including Arab countries, 
may not find it sensible to spend time and coston a complaint in 
anticipation of their inability to enforce even apositive panel ruling. 
On their part, developed countries should understand that they 
cannot expect to have a stable and rule-based system if they comply 
with WTO decision(s) when it suits them and do not comply when it 
does not suit.  
 
 
E     Cultural Attitude 
 
Arab tradition and history may reveal other reasons for the limited 
participation of Arab countries in the WTO dispute settlement 
process. The Arab culture disfavors the adversarial process of 
litigation. The Arabic tradition has always preferred sulh, which 
embodies the concepts of settlement and reconciliation, over formal 
litigation.69 Even arbitration, the principal form of alternative dispute 
resolution, has long been viewed skeptically and with hostility.70 
                                                 
67 See Jide Nzelibe, ‘The Role and Limits of Legal Regulation of Conflicts of 
Interest (Part I): The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of 
Retaliation in the World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism’ 
(2005) 6(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 215, 228-230. See also Bernard M. 
Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, and Philip English, Development, Trade, and the 
WTO: A Handbook (World Bank Publications, 2002) 77-78. 
68 Hoekman, Mattoo and English, above n 67, 85-86. 
69 Walid Iqbal, ‘Courts, Lawyering, and ADR: Glimpses into the Islamic 
Tradition’ (2000) 28(4) Fordham Urban Law Journal 1035, 1037.    
70 See Charles N. Brower and Jeremy K. Sharpe, ‘International Arbitration and 
the Islamic World: The Third Phase’ (2003) 97(3) American Journal of 
International Law 643 (the legal community throughout the Arab world is still 
manifesting its hostility to transnational arbitration mainly as a result of the 
great publicity devoted to the criticism of certain unfortunate arbitral awards 
rendered by western arbitrators who excluded, with terms of a humiliating 
nature, the application of the national applicable legal systems of Arab 
countries).   
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Negotiations and compromises are the traditional path.71 It is a 
question of style. The preference for sulh is often a reflection of 
larger social and cultural perceptions of conflict generally. In Arab 
countries, the notion of conflict typically carries a highly negative 
connotation.72 Viewed as disruptive and dangerous to social 
cohesion, conflict represents something to be avoided.73 
Understandably, this mindset makes formal litigation an unpopular 
dispute resolution mechanism in Arab countries, given its inherent 
adversarial elements. 
 
 
In other cultures, litigation is considered the preferred mode for 
enforcing and settling differences. Countries with more litigious 
domestic norms tend to file more complaints at the WTO.74 The US 
is well-known for its litigious society having the highest number of 
lawyers per population.75 In contrast, Arab countries have a smaller 
number of lawyers per population.76 This is a simple indication that 
if a country has a high number of lawyers, that country would be 
inclined to be more litigious. 
 
 
                                                 
71 See Rosa María González Tirados, ‘Negotiation. An A-Z Guide’ (2010) 48(6) 
Management Decision 1023–1027 (Arabs prefer to establish personal relations 
and resolve issues through mediation or continued negotiation). 
72 See Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ‘Conflict Resolution Approaches: Western and 
Middle Eastern Lessons and Possibilities’ (1996) 55(1) American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 35, 46.    
73 Ibid. 
74 See Ji Li, ‘From ‘“See You in Court!” to “See You in Geneva!”: An Empirical 
Study of the Role of Social Norms in International Trade Dispute Resolution’ 
(2007) 32(2) Yale Journal of International Law 485, 496-499, 507.  
75 See Khosrow Fatemi (ed), International Trade in the 21st Century (Elsevier 
Science, 1997) 227-228 (the United States leads the world by a wide margin on 
the total number of lawyers and lawyers per million. It is also very interesting, 
or perhaps frightening, to further note that 35 percent of the lawyers in the 
world in 1992 lived, and presumably practiced law, in the United States).  
76 For example, Lebanon has approximately 8000 lawyers; Morocco has 9190 
lawyers; Tunisia has 2800 lawyers; and Yemen has 250 lawyers. See Omar 
Zain, Study into the Status and Tools Used by Lawyers in Arab Countries 
(2004) 34-35, 
 <http://www.pogar.org/publications/judiciary/lawyers-study.pdf>. 
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     In the future, the process may become more confrontational so 
that the Arab countries press their interests in trade disputes. 
Through litigation Arab countries would send a signal to other WTO 
members that negotiation is one option for resolving a trade dispute, 
but it is not the only option. Arab countries should employ litigation 
and negotiation at the same time because litigation plays an 
important role in informing negotiations. 
 
 
F    Other Detriments to Effective Participation 
 
There are other hurdles that weigh negatively on Arab countries’ 
choice to launch a WTO case, albeit to a lesser degree if compared 
with the hurdles discussed earlier. One impediment relates to 
language issues. Currently, the WTO uses three working languages 
(English, Spanish, and French).77 Arabic, a language spoken by 280 
million people, is not an official language at the WTO.78 Arab 
officials must work in a foreign language in WTO dispute settlement 
procedures. Thus, these officials can be at a linguistic 
disadvantage.79 Even if WTO agreements are translated into Arabic, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to translate highly legalistic 
and technical terms into Arabic without compromising the original 
meanings of the words. Therefore, Arab officials would need to 
master WTO agreements and to do so in a foreign language, namely 
English. 
 
 
Another hurdle is the protracted period of the WTO dispute 
settlement process which could last up to five years. The period 
                                                 
77 See World Trade Organization, Languages (9 January 2012) 
<http://www.wto.org/>. 
78 One may argue that adding more workinglanguages, such as Arabic, to the 
WTO could considerably complicate its work and put a heavy burden on its 
cost-effectiveness. See Daniel Pruzin, ‘WTO Chief Urges Budget Increase, 
Highlights Dispute Settlement Logjam.’ (2000) 17 International Trade 
Reporter (BNA) 1469 (the average panel report of 370 pages is typically 
delayed in its release by eleven weeks due to translation bottlenecks). 
79 See Kim Van der Borght, Reform and Development of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System (Cameron May, 2006) 314. 
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includes consultation time, panel proceedings, and enforcement.80 In 
addition, a motivated and well-funded party may cause significant 
delays and even derail the dispute settlement process by not 
providing the relevant information or if the information provided is 
missing essential details. For example, in a Brazilian case against US 
cotton subsidies, the US refused to supply information requested by 
Brazil concerning farm-specific contract payment and cotton 
planting information.81 During the time when the case is being 
litigated, countries could lose their market share and even exporting 
opportunities. Thus, prolonged WTO dispute settlement proceedings force 
Arab countries to mull over their options before launching a case.  
 
 
Governments in Arab countries are the only party assured of any 
decision-making role in international trade matters. This is attributed 
to, in part, the Arab countries' constitutions. For instance, the 
Jordanian constitution bestows the responsibility for negotiating 
international agreements on the government and tasks it with 
ensuring adherence to obligations emerging from these agreements.82 
At the same time, however, no clear procedures are provided in the 
constitution or elsewhere to facilitate consultation between the 
government and external stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
80 The average time between the establishment of a panel and the expiry of the 
reasonable period of time to comply is in general over two years or over four 
years once the consultation period is added. If the issue of enforcement is taken 
into consideration, then the period can be significantly prolonged. See Erin N. 
Palmer, ‘The World Trade Organization Slips Up: A Critique of the World 
Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding Through the European 
Union Banana Dispute’ (2002) 69(2) Tennessee Law Review 443, 455-459, 
466-474. See also Shin-yi Peng, ‘How Much Time is Reasonable? - The 
Arbitral Decisions under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU’ (2008) 26(1) Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 323, 328, 331. 
81 See Daniel Pruzin, ‘Brazil Asks Cotton Dispute Panel to Draw 'Adverse 
Inferences' against United States.’ (2004) 21 International Trade Reporter 
(BNA) 541 (the United States countered that the information requested could 
not be supplied, as it was covered by the confidentiality provisions of the 1974 
US Privacy Act. Brazil needs the informationto help prove its claims that the 
contract payments are actually product-specific support, which then becomes 
actionable under WTO subsidy rules).  
82 Constitution of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan 1952 (Jordan) art 33. 
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     The relative size and strength of the sector to the total economy 
plays an important role in determining whether to launch a WTO case 
or not. If the sector in question contributes significantly to gross 
domestic product (GDP) compared with other sectors then the 
government can be induced to launch a case. However, this 
assumption is not correct in all cases. For example, a sector - like 
agriculture in the US - could make only a small contribution to GDP 
but nevertheless carry large political clout that forces the government 
to budge for its demands.83 Thus, factors such as importance, size, 
and political clout influence the government's decision to launch a 
WTO case.  
 
 
In the context of the WTO, consultative mechanisms between 
governments andthe private sector in Arab countries are weak if not 
non-existent.84 It must be remembered that the WTO is a 
government-driven organisation. However, governments represent 
their domestic industries and lobby on their behalf. Thus, the private 
sector in Arab countries should be included in WTO issues more 
frequently than is currently experienced, especially in disputes 
whereby the private sector is the one which alerts the governments to 
possible violations in order to bring a case. The private sector is 
better positioned to know the industry harmed or be familiar with the 
nature of the harm. 
                                                 
83 See J.W. Looney et al., Agricultural Law: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing 
Farm Clients (American Bar Association, 1990) 5-10, 191-205: (many of the 
US subsidy programs date back to the farm financial crises of 1930s and 1980s. 
Certain reasons may provide as an explanation for the divergent treatment of 
agriculture in the US Farming is viewed as a unique way of life dependent on 
natural forces which are beyond the farmer’s control. Farmers are also viewed 
as a stabilising element in society because of their vital role in food and fibre 
production. Farmland is a major source of aesthetically and psychologically 
pleasing open space and locale for many non-farm recreational activities. 
Farmers are a distinct minority in the US; they constitute about two percent of 
the total population. Farmers receive specialised legal treatment as an attempt 
to protect them from the generally urban orientation of law and government. 
Lastly, their lack of participation beyond the production stage of agriculture is 
a contributing factor to their inability to attain adequate income). 
84 See Ali A. Soliman, Role of the Private Sector in Arab Economic and Social 
Development (Center for the Study of Developing Countries, 2004) 32-46. 
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The EC-GSP case between the EC and India illustrates the 
detrimental effect that lack of consultation between governments and 
other stakeholders can have in WTO dispute settlement cases. In that 
case, the EC had granted tariff concessions to 12 developing 
countries, excluding India, as part of its Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) scheme.85 Only after a panel to hear the dispute 
had been formed and the proceedings were well underway did 
TEXTROCIL, an association representing the clothing sector, 
submit a memorandum to the Indian government calling on it to 
address the difficulties placed on the clothing sector by the Drug 
Arrangements.86 Having acted independently, TEXTROCIL was 
obviously unaware of the measures already initiated by the 
government several months before in an effort to counter the impact 
of the Drug Arrangements. Notwithstanding the evident lack of 
coordination between the activities of the Indian government and 
those of the private sector, the information brought to light by 
TEXTROCIL provided useful evidence in the case against the EC 
and helped India win.87 The fact that TEXTROCIL requested 
government intervention several months after the government had 
lodged a formal WTO complaint demonstrates the extent of the 
disconnect between the Indian government and private-sector 
stakeholders when it comes to WTO matters. 
                                                 
85 The concessions included special arrangements aimed at rewarding some of the 
beneficiary countries for their efforts in fighting drug production and 
trafficking (the Drug Arrangements). Implementation of the Drug 
Arrangements by the EC meant that the beneficiary countries enjoyed better 
tariff concessions relative to the excluded countries. India felt that this made it 
unjustifiably more difficult for its exports to enter the EC market, while also 
illegally taking away the benefits due to it being under the most favored nation 
(MFN) provisions in Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994 as well as paragraphs 2(a), 
3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling Clause. See Gregory C. Shaffer and Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz, Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country 
Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 182-184.   
86 In its submissions, TEXTROCIL highlighted, among other things, the fact that 
the implementation of the Drug Arrangements had led to an increase in 
clothing exports going into the EC from Pakistan, one of the beneficiaries of 
the arrangements, and a decline in India’s clothing exports to the same 
destination. See Shaffer and Meléndez-Ortiz, above n 85. 
87 Ibid. 
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Arab countries should build bridges with the private sector 
during WTO negotiations every time a dispute arises. Such bridges 
include the establishment of public-private partnerships.88 Public-
private partnerships can enhance a country's ability to provide 
credible commitments and mutually bear the costs of possible 
litigation. Moreover, critical inputs from the private sector can be 
helpful in terms of determining whether or not a particular WTO 
case is won or lost. 
 
 
 
V     OTHER AVENUES FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Although Arab countries rarely participate directly in the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, there could be indirect avenues for 
them to enhance theirintervention. One area in which Arab countries 
have been actively involved is their participation as third parties. 
Under WTO jurisprudence, only countries that have "substantial 
interests" at stake can participate in dispute proceedings.89 
                                                 
88 See Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and 
the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector’, (2005) 8 
Journal of International Economic Law 861, 873. For a discussion on how 
such partnerships can impact on the ability of a country to initiate disputes, 
taking the EU and US examples, see Gregory Shaffer, ‘What's New in EU 
Trade Dispute Settlement? Judicialization, Public-Private Networks and the 
WTO Legal Order’ (2006) 13(6) Journal of European Public Policy 832, 839-
842: (In both the US and the EU, there is an established tradition of 
cooperation between government and local businesses in dealing with 
international trade matters. These public-private partnerships have come about 
as a result of the interdependence that has evolved between the two sides over 
the years. On the one hand, private businesses rely on the governments to 
represent their interests in WTO matters, including the dispute settlement 
mechanism. On the other, the governments have come to depend on the 
organisational, financial, political and informational resources possessed by 
some of the private businesses in order to achieve and sustain their objectives 
in the WTO).  
89 The expression “substantial interest” is not capable of a precise definition and 
accordingly may present difficulties for the WTO. It is, however, intended to 
be construed to cover only those countries which have, or in the absence of 
discriminatory quantitative restrictions affecting their exports could reasonably 
be expected to have, a significant share in the market of the country seeking to 
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Additionally, the Appellate Body amended its working procedures 
whereby it gives a third party an automatic right to appear at the oral 
hearing even though no written submission has been forwarded if 
there is a notification to the Appellate Body's secretariat compared 
with the previous practice where a written submission must be filed 
first before appearing at the hearing.90 Although the amendment 
constitutes a step forward, the decision to allow a third party to 
participate in a case without previous written submission is left to 
the Appellate Body to decide on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
Thus far, four Arab countries have been involved as third parties 
in eight disputes. Egypt has been involved in five different disputes, 
Bahrain and Kuwait has been involved in one dispute, and Saudi 
Arabia has been involved in two disputes.91 As third parties, Arab 
countries act merely as observers. However, there are instances 
when Arab countries actually made substantive submissions. For 
example, Egypt in the Bed Linen case, as third party, argued quite 
controversially that article 15 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement 
obligated the EU to explore the possibilities of constructive remedies 
                                                                                                                
modify or withdraw the concession. See Chi Carmody, ‘Of Substantial 
Interest: Third Parties under GATT’ (1997)18(4) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 615, 626, 637.  
90 See Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2003, WTO Doc. WT/AB/1 (May 7, 
2004) 34-37.  
91 Egypt: European Communities - Provisional Safeguard Measures on Imports 
of Certain Steel Products - Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the 
United States, WTO Doc WT/DS260/4, (19 August 2002); European 
Communities -Antidumping Duties on Imports of Bed Linen from India, WTO 
DocWT/DS141/19) (29 April 2003); Turkey - Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Rice - Status Report by Turkey, WTO Doc WT/DS334/14 (10 
October 2008); United States - Continued Existence and Application of 
Zeroing Methodology - Status Report by the United States – Addendum, WTO 
Doc WT/DS350/18/Add.7 (9 July 2010), Bahrain: United States - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WTO Doc WT/DS379/5 (29 March 2010), Kuwait: United States - Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WTO Doc WT/DS379/5 (29 March 2010), and Saudi Arabia: United States - 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, WTO Doc WT/DS379/5 (29 March 2010); China - Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc WT/DS394/9 (18 
May 2010).  
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before applying anti-dumping duties, and that the EU failed to 
comply with this provision, as it did not suggest to the Egyptian 
exporters the possibility of, for instance, price undertakings.92 Egypt 
was of the view that article 15 imposes a legal obligation on 
developed countries any time they contemplate imposing anti-
dumping duties, and it is therefore up to those developed countries 
then to suggest to the developing countries involved whether or not 
they would be interested in offering price undertakings. 
 
 
Arab countries with vested legal interests can take part in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings. The burden falls on Arab countries 
to make their own determination whenever they have interests at 
stake. Arab countries can test the waters as third-party participants to 
develop expertise. Third party participation is not that costly since a 
third party is not required to file a formal submission, and when it 
does, the submission can be short and non-technical in nature.93 
However, third party status is not a permanent solution or alternative 
to actual participation as complainants.  
 
 
Arab countries may also have the chance to participate in 
disputes through amicus curiae briefs.94 Morocco was the first Arab 
country, and indeed the first WTO member, to submit amicus curiae. 
In European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines case, 
                                                 
92 See Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WTO Doc WT/DS141/R (30 October 
2000).  
93 See Shaffer and Melendez-Ortiz, above n 85, 174-178. 
94 Amicus curiae means submissions by non-parties in WTO dispute proceedings. 
See Padideh Ala’i, ‘Judicial Lobbying At the WTO: The Debate over the Use 
of Amicus Curiae Briefs and the US Experience’ (2000) 24(1) Fordham 
International Law Journal 62, 84-86 (the solitary support of the US for amicus 
curiae submissions before the WTO Appellate Body can be attributed to the 
US legal system’s historical familiarity with the institution of amicus curiae 
and its evolution from “friend of the court” to a “judicial lobbyist” within the 
US Supreme Court jurisprudence. The function of amicus curiae at common 
law was one of oral shepardising or the bringing up of cases not known to the 
judge).  
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Morocco submitted an amicus curiae brief.95 Morocco submitted its 
amicus curiae even though it did not participate as a third party in 
the dispute at the panel level. The Appellate Body held that in its prior 
rulings on the issue, it had never distinguished between amicus curiae 
briefs from WTO members or from other sources such as individuals or 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Appellate Body stated 
that it could not treat non-members more favorably than members 
themselves with respect to the submission of such briefs, and that 
nothing in the rules prevents a WTO Member from submitting an 
amicus curiae brief.96 Ultimately, the Appellate Body went on to say 
that the Moroccan amicus submission failed to assist in the appeal 
because the factual information provided in the brief was not 
pertinent to the appeal.97 
 
 
It seems that the Appellate Body added more rights to, and 
obligations on the part of WTO members setting an example for 
NGOs, academia, industrial associations to submit amicus briefs. 
However, filing amicus curiae briefs by Arab countries does not 
guarantee that WTO dispute settlement panels will take them into 
account in deciding cases. Panels have discretionary authority either 
to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted 
to it, whether requested by a panel or not. Further, amicus briefs 
must be "pertinent and useful" to the dispute in question otherwise 
they can be rejected as evident in the Sardine decision.    
 
 
                                                 
95 The dispute was between Peru and the EU. Peru had requested consultations 
with the EU following a Council Regulation (EEC No. 2136/89) that purported 
to lay down common market standards for trade in preserved sardines. Article 
2 of the EU Regulation provided, inter alia, that only products prepared from 
Sardina pilchardus may be marketed as preserved sardines. In other words, 
only products of this species may have the word “sardines” as part of the name 
on the container. According to this regulation, Sardino pssagax, found mainly 
in the Eastern Pacific along the coasts of Peru and Chile could not be marketed 
as such. Sardinops Sardina pilchardusis is found mainly around the coasts of 
the Eastern North Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Black Sea. See 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of 
Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/AB/R (26 September 2002) [166]-[167]. 
96 Ibid [161]-[165]. 
97 Ibid [167]. 
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Regarding participation as panelists or as Appellate Body members 
the trend is that of satisfactory involvement. At the panel level, three 
Arab panelists were selected to rule in nine cases.98 At the Appellate 
Body level, since 1995 two Arab nationals served as members. 
These were late Said El-Naggar of Egypt (1995-2000) and George 
Abi-Saab of Egypt (2004-2008).99 The list of Arab panelists 
indicates a high level of professionalism.  
                                                 
98 These Arab panelists are: Maamoun Abdel-Fattah of Egypt, Magda Shahin of 
Egypt, and Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco. Maamoun Abdel-Fattah 
participated in several cases; see, eg, Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting 
Desiccated Coconut, WTO Doc WT/DS22/R (17 October 1996), Panel Report, 
Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc 
WT/DS70/RW (9 May 2000); Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the 
Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc WT/DS70/R (14 April 1999); Panel 
Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat 
Gluten from the European Communities, WTO Doc WT/DS166/R (31 July 
2000); Panel Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 
of 2000, WTO Doc WT/DS217/R (16 September 2002); Panel Report, 
European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or 
Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WTO Doc WT/DS219/R (7 March 2003); Arbitrator 
Decision, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 200-
Original Complaint by the European Communities-Recourse to Arbitration by 
the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO Doc 
WT/DS217/ARB/EEC (31 August 2004); while Magda Shahin participated in 
one case: Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WTO Doc WT/DS69/AB/R (13 
July 1998); and Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi involved in one case: European 
Communities-Selected Customs Matters, WTO Doc No. WT/DS315/1 (27 
September 2004).     
99 Said El-Naggar sat on the bench of some of the important cases in the history 
of the WTO. The list includes Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc 
No. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 
1996);European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and 
Distribution of Banana, WTO Doc WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 
1997);Brazil-Export Financing Program for Aircraft, WTO Doc 
WT/DS46/AB/R (2 August 1999); India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports 
of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO WT/DS90/AB/R (23 
August 1999). Also, George Abi-Saab participated in important cases. The list 
includes United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat 
Gluten from the European Countries, WTO Doc WT/DS166/AB/R (22 
December 2000);Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn 
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WTO WT/DS132/AB/RW (22 October 
2001); United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products, WTO Doc WT/DS248/R (11 July 2003);United States-Sunset 
Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
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    Even if Arab countries are represented at the panel and Appellate 
Body levels, still Arab panelists are outnumbered by panelists from 
developed countries similar in size, such as New Zealand or 
Switzerland.100 Panelists from these and other countries are selected 
more frequently.101 This state of affair relates, in part, to the number 
of persons with legal expertise in trade matters. Further, adding more 
Arab panelists could lead to concerns among WTO members, 
especially other developing countries, about fairness in geographical 
representation.102 Regarding the nationality of the panelists and 
Appellate Body members, Arab representation is quite encouraging.  
 
 
     There are some provisions in the DSU that give special treatment 
for developing and least-developed countries.103 The special and 
differential treatment provisions have been less than effective due 
                                                                                                                
Products from Japan, WTO Doc WT/DS244/AB/R (15 December 2002); 
European Communities -Conditions for the Granting of Tariffs Preferences to 
Developing Countries, WTO Doc WT/DS246/AB/R (7 April 2004). For more 
on biographies of Arab Appellate Body members see World Trade 
Organization, Appellate Body Members (2012)  
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_bio_e.htm#abi_sa
ab>. 
100 In representation a patterns emerge: first, special privileges for the US, as the 
world's largest trader; second, special privileges for the world's four largest 
traders (currently, China, the European Union, Japan, and the US), a group 
known as “the Quad”; and third, a rotational system between developed and 
developing nations. See Jacob Katz Cogan, ‘Representation and Power in 
International Organization: The Operational Constitution and its Critics’ 
(2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 209, 232-233.  
101 Like the other members of the Quad, the US is also reserved a seat de facto on 
the WTO's Appellate Body. Katz Cogan, above n 100, 232-233. 
102 The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding states that panel membership 
shall be broadly representative. See Marrakesh, above n 7, article 17(3).   
103 Examples include article 4.10 which states that members to give 
“specialattention” to the particular problems and interests of developing 
countries during consultations; article 8.10 which states that developing 
countries can require that at least one panelist in cases concerning them be a 
national of a developing country; article 27.2 which relates to the provision of 
the Secretariat of services of qualified legal if a developing country requests 
so. See Andrea M. Ewart, ‘Small Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural 
Approach to Special and Differential Treatment through Reforms to Dispute 
Settlement’ (2007) 35(1) Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 
27, 42-43.  
14 FLJ 1]                                     BASHAR MALKAWI 
 
31 
 
totheir vagueness and lack of procedures to guide their application.104 
For instance, article 12.11 of the DSU mandates that a panel's report 
should explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken 
of relevant provisions on differential and more favorable treatment 
for developing country members. However, to date, article 12.11 of 
the DSU has been cited in three cases butwas not taken into 
consideration in any of the panel's recommendations.105 It may be 
noted that ineffectiveness can be considered part of a wider problem 
in the sense that a number of special and differential treatment 
provisions in various WTO agreements are of a declaratory nature 
and, in the absence of implementation rules, have not been of any 
practical use to developing countries.  
 
 
An important step has been taken to assist developing countries 
in WTO dispute settlement through the establishment of the 
Advisory Center on WTO Law.106 The Advisory Center is 
independent from the WTO and open to all WTO members, but only 
developing countries and economies in transition can use its 
                                                 
104 Ewart, above n 103, 42-43.  
105 In the case of the US against India on Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of 
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, India referred to article XVIII:B 
of GATT on the balance-of-payments as a relevant provision on special and 
differential treatment. See Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative 
Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999). In the case against the US on 
Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Indonesia referred to article 
15 on special and differential treatment in the Antidumping Agreement as 
being undermined by US action. See Appellate Body Report, United States -
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WTO Doc 
WT/DS217/AB/R (16 January 2003). In the case of the US against Mexico on 
Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Mexico referred to GATS 
provisions on differential and more favorable treatment for developing country 
Members. See Panel Report, Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications 
Services, WTO Doc WT/DS204/R (2 April 2004).    
106 The Advisory Center on WTO Law has been established to alleviate article 
27.2 of the DSU problem which provides legal advice and assistance through 
the WTO Secretariat. To fulfill its mandate, the Secretariat dedicated only two 
legal affairs officers and engaged two consultants who are available one day a 
week. See Kim Van der Borght, ‘The Advisory Center on WTO Law: 
Advancing Fairness and Equality’ (1999) 2(4) Journal of International 
Economic Law 723, 724-727.  
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services. Currently, four Arab countries are members of the 
Advisory Center.107 However, there is no obvious reason why more 
Arab countries have not joined yet. Hence, it can be suggested that it 
is perhaps a lack of interest or lack of knowledge of the importance 
of the Advisory Center that is the reason for the limited membership 
to date. 
 
 
The Advisory Center organises seminars on WTO jurisprudence, 
offers affordable legal advice on WTO law, provides support in 
WTO proceedings, and permits internships for officials dealing with 
WTO legal issues.108 In other words, the Advisory Center on WTO 
Law manages many tasks that aim to assist developing countries in 
understanding WTO law and participating in its dispute settlement 
process should the need arises. The Advisory Center resembles a law 
office that specialises in WTO law, but has its own limitations. For 
example, the Advisory Center imposes limitations on the number of 
professionals and hours allocated per each case.109 
 
 
                                                 
107 Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia are members of the Advisory Center. Egypt 
and Tunisia are original members of the Advisory Center which signed the 
agreement establishing the Center while Jordan was the first country to accede 
to the agreement followed by Oman. Late Said El-Naggar of Egypt, former 
Appellate Body member, held a seat in the management board for two years 
term starting 2001. See Advisory Center on WTO Law, Developing Countries 
(January 6 2012) 
<http://www.acwl.ch/e/members/developing_countries.html>. 
108 The Advisory Center sources of income are: user charges, revenues from an 
endowment fund, and traditional donor contributions. To function, the 
Advisory Center has an executive director and six experienced professionals 
who have an interest in advancing the interests of developing countries. See 
also Chad Bown and Rachel McCulloch, ‘Developing Countries, Dispute 
Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law’ (2010) 19(1) Journal of 
International Trade and Economic Development 33-63.  
109 The estimated hours per case are 700 hours for a simple case. Another criticism 
directed toward the Advisory Center is the fact that there may be real 
duplication between its work and the work of the WTO Technical Cooperation 
Division. Even more, the Advisory Center executive director will have the 
power to decide whether a case brought to the Center by a developing country 
has legal merit or not. See Van der Borght, above n 106, 728. 
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Despite these limitations, Arab countries should consider 
becoming involved in the Center until they have their own in-house 
counsels and deeper expertise in international trade law. Countries 
such as India owe part of their success in the WTO dispute 
mechanism to assistance from the Advisory Center.110 Joining the 
Advisory Center seems to be at least a partial solution to some of the 
problems of under-participation describedearlier.  
 
 
There are a range of other measures at the disposal of Arab 
countries which can go a long way towards helping them participate 
effectively in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. One such 
measure is making better use of academics in Arab universities, 
some of whom have specialised knowledge of international trade. 
These trade law specialists could be of tremendous help in handling 
international trade issues. An internship program could also be 
introduced to expose young Arabs from different sections of the 
public and private sectors to the way the WTO system works in 
practice. 
 
 
 
VI     CONCLUSIONS 
 
Arab countries fail to make significant use of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Egypt has been the Arab country most frequently 
involved in the WTO dispute settlement process as a respondent in a 
stand-alone case, as well as a third party.The one area in which Arab 
countries have been comparatively active is in participation as third 
parties. However, no Arab country - even Egypt - has ever 
participated as a complainant. Marginal participation indicates that 
Arab countries have not fully engaged the WTO system and their 
role remains insignificant. 
 
 
                                                 
110 While the private industry, in India's triumph over the EC in the EC-GSP case, 
provided some of the evidence that was used in the substantive arguments, 
legal support for the dispute was provided by the Advisory Centre for WTO 
Law in Geneva. See Shaffer and Melendez-Ortiz, above n 85, 185. 
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Lack of effective participation is not confined to the WTO 
dispute settlement process itself - such as the issues of enforcement 
and proof of legitimate interest - but to other factors specific to Arab 
countries. These factors include insufficient human resources, 
financial constraints, trade volume, absence of private sector 
involvement, political considerations, and cultural attitude toward 
like-litigation proceedings. With the exception of Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, Arab countries will operate at the margins of the dispute 
settlement system for many of the reasons identified. 
 
 
Even if Arab countries do not use the WTO dispute settlement as 
complainants because of legal capacity for example, among other 
factors, they certainly could make use of amicus curiae. Amicus 
curiae briefs constitute a useful base to develop sound legal 
argument. Moreover, Arab countries could use the system by 
participating as third parties. To a certain degree, participation as 
third parties lead Arab countries to gain insights into the mechanics 
of the WTO settlement process and exposures to panel and Appellate 
Body procedures. Egypt and Saudi Arabia could help by sharing 
expertise, organising, and covering the cost of third party 
participation in cases of major interest to the Arab members. Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia also have the financial resources to encourage 
more trade training of Middle Eastern attorneys. 
 
 
As members of the Advisory Center on WTO Law, those Arab 
countries are entitled to draw assistance from the Center which was 
originally established to enforce WTO rights of developing 
countries. Consequently, more Arab countries should become 
members of the Center and should make full use of this membership. 
The Center could then be used to give opinions and draft WTO 
arguments for the benefit of these countries.  
 
 
Arguably, the options mentioned above do not form exclusive 
alternatives to litigation, but could be options used to protect Arab 
countries’ trade interests. Furthermore, it is necessary to realise that 
litigation in matters of trade does not necessarily conflict with 
maintaining good political relationships among disputing countries. 
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Arab countries should, therefore, not shy away from utilising the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Even if they are still not fully 
integrated in the multilateral trading system and if there is limited 
need for disputes, Arab countries ought to utilise the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. The dispute settlement mechanism is not 
only about disputes; it is an evolving body of international trade law 
principles that are increasingly being shaped by those WTO 
members who are active participants. Arab countries can no longer 
afford to ignore the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
 
